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Abstract
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) are public policies put into effect to help alleviate the harmful
consequences of air pollution. Every state has a unique form of standards corresponding to their natural resources.
More states have implemented the policy to increase the generation of renewable energy; however, many stand
opposed to the policy in fear that it will increase electricity prices. The influence that RPS has on the price of
electricity is not entirely understood. Previous literature confirms that RPS, on average, increases prices by three
percent. This paper focuses on analyzing the effect of RPS on electricity rates over a longer period. Furthermore,
it incorporates the effect of various forms of energy deregulation across state energy markets. Results confirm
that RPS does increase electricity rates in states with regulated energy markets; however, the implementation of
retail choice and wholesale market access reverses these findings and decreases electricity prices overall.
Individuals across the country will be able to make a more informed decision on public policies related renewable
energy with this analysis.
Keywords: Renewable energy, Sustainability, Renewable portfolio standards, Electricity prices, Deregulation,
Public policy
Renewable Portfolio Standards (also known as
RPS) are an example of a command-and-control
regulation implemented throughout many US states.
An RPS is defined as a “requirement on retail electric
suppliers to supply a minimum percentage or amount
of its retail load with eligible sources of renewable
energy” (Barbose, 2017, p. 5). Each state has its own
unique RPS that affects different types of electric
utilities and has different compliance requirements. By
2017, twenty-nine states and Washington D.C. have
implemented RPS regulations in order to diversify
energy sources, promote innovation and economic
development, and reduce emissions (National
Conference of State Legislatures [NCSL], 2018). Eight
other states have implemented a “voluntary” renewable
energy standard, or target that is not legally binding

(NCSL, 2018). These states are represented by a lighter
green color in Figure 1, and will not be incorporated
into the analysis while the grey states have neither an
RPS nor renewable energy target.
Deregulation is characterized in a few different
ways. If electric utilities have access to wholesale
markets, they may be able to decrease retail prices.
This is one way a state may allow for deregulation; the
other option is to permit retail choice within the state.
Retail choice allows consumers to select any provider
for their electricity; without it, there is a monopoly on
electricity. Craig and Savage (2013) define full
competition as having access to both wholesale and
retail choice within a state. This paper examines all
three types of deregulation, retail choice, access to
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wholesale markets, or both-full competition, as a form
of deregulation in its analysis.
Of the twenty-nine states that have an RPS
mandate, fifteen of them have a fully deregulated
electricity market. These states include: California,
Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts,
Maryland, Maine, Michigan, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
and Texas (Zummo, 2018). The exact year of
deregulation for each of the following states’ energy
markets, along with the years that they adopted RPS
can be seen in Table 1. Some states, such as Virginia,
have a deregulated market and no RPS, while states
like Nevada have an RPS with a regulated market. This
provides the data set a wide range of variability in its
sample size.
Sustainability is a rising issue that public policy
makers and individuals are starting to care more about
in recent years. This behavior encourages the
implementation of policies that help promote the use of
renewable energy sources over conventional fossil fuel
substitutes within states. However, the progression of
these policies is hindered if the public is discouraged
by increasing prices. Every state designs its own set of
RPS laws specific to its desired goals. The Database of
State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency displays
the RPS policies paired with its state on the map in
Figure 2. More states may adopt the policy if made
aware of the costs and benefits.
The regulation of electricity in some states may
be slowing down sustainability measures, and the
unknown effects of deregulating the market has made
citizens in states such as Nevada uncertain on how to
vote on ballot initiatives in its 2018 midterm elections.
Nevada’s energy market is monopolized by one
provider, NV Energy. The 2018 midterm ballot
questions asked citizens to vote on deregulating the
state’s energy markets and increasing the state’s RPS
requirement from 25% by 2025 to 50% by 2030 (Clark
County Elections Department, 2018).1 The New York
Times (2018) presents the results from the election to
be “no” for a deregulated energy market and “yes” to
an increased RPS initiative. The effects of voting “no”
to deregulation is unknown when looking into what is
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best for citizens in Nevada in regards to electricity
prices. Nevada, however, is only one example of a state
with a regulated electricity market and an RPS
initiative.
This paper attempts to analyze what impact an
RPS will have on electricity prices in states with a
deregulated electricity market. Using a panel data set,
data are collected from utilities across all fifty states
dated from 1990 to 2017. There is a challenge when
estimating data from states with an RPS and non-RPS
states. Tra (2015) explains that electric utilities in RPS
states have unobservable differences from those in
other states, resulting in variations of electricity rates.
This references how states with RPS have more
renewable energy potential due to the prominent
sunlight, wind, dams, etc. These unobserved
differences might produce biased estimates when
running an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression
(Tra, 2015).
Characteristics of an RPS: States adopting the
Renewable Portfolio Standard mandate have goals that
vary depending on geographic location and renewable
energy availability. Neimeyer et al. (2009) explains
that each state RPS is characterized differently
depending on (1) eligible technologies, (2) the
percentage generation/capacity requirements from
renewable sources overtime, (3) special treatment of
individual technologies, (4) the presence and level of
an alternative compliance payment (ACP), and (5)
credit multipliers for certain resources or geographies.
The type of electric utilities affected by the RPS
standard also vary per state. Affected utility ownership
types include municipalities, cooperatives, and/or
investor-owned companies. Some states have a more
aggressive RPS program because of their access to
low-cost renewable resources (Neimeyer et al., 2009).
Lower costs allow those states to have a higher
percentage generation capacity given a certain period
of time because renewable energy resources are widely
available. For example, Nevada’s solar power potential
makes it easier/more practical for the state to

1

Full questions can be retrieved from:
https://www.clarkcountynv.gov/election/Pages/2018_QuestsGen.
aspx
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implement solar panels when compared to states like
Alaska.
An RPS is a binding regulation which requires
states to implement ways to enforce it. It is a form of a
command-and-control policy that is unlikely to result
naturally through market competition. Grossman and
Cole (1999) explain how many believe that commandand-control policies are less efficient or completely
inefficient because they produce a greater social cost
than benefit. RPS mandates are more expensive to
impose on certain utilities, so states must ensure that
utilities will comply with the standard. States do this
by having mandates backed by a penalty. Tra (2015)
explains the three options a utility has in order to
comply with a states’ RPS mandate: (1) own a facility
that uses approved renewable energy sources to
produce electricity, (2) purchase electricity from a
renewable energy facility, and (3) purchase Renewable
Energy Credits (RECs). 2 In some states, a utility that
does not meet the goal set by the state is subjected to a
penalty known as an alternative compliance payment
(ACP) (Solar Energy Industry Association (SEIA),
2013). If an electric utility does not comply, it will be
forced to pay the compliance fee. The Solar Energy
Industry Association (2013) mentions that utilities may
also purchase RECs that can be traded to meet a state’s
RPS. The REC prices are based on ACP rates and
current/expected supply-demand balance, which
makes them volatile and sensitive to changes in
eligibility rules (Barbose, 2017). Since every RPS
mandate is different, state characteristics play a role in
defining why specific standards and rules for an RPS
are created.
Characteristics of Deregulation: Energy deregulation
is a broad term that can be defined in different ways.
Energy markets are supplied by vertically-integrated
utilities that monopolized energy generation within
their geographic area (Craig & Savage, 2013).
Recently, some of these markets are being restructured
to allow for market competition amongst utilities.
Wholesale electricity sales are allowed in some states
as well, regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC). Market restructuring began with
the Federal Energy Policy Act of 1992 and FERC
Order No. 888 in 1996 (Craig & Savage, 2013). The
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Federal Energy Act created wholesale generators that
sell and generate electricity at the wholesale level, and
they provided FERC the ability to grant powerproducers the use of transmission lines from any entity
to provide electricity to wholesale customers. States
were also exposed to retail competition that allowed
consumers to buy electricity from different retailers.
Craig and Savage (2013) explain that the competitive
wholesale and retail forces are supposed to
incentivize managers to increase efficiency and
become more innovative to decrease their costs. As
previously stated, the estimator will classify
deregulation as either accessibility to retail choice,
wholesale markets, or both.
When it comes to the various ownership types
in the analysis, cooperatives and municipalities are less
likely to be exposed to, or affected by, deregulation in
states that have allowed for it. Nueces Electric
Cooperative (2018) distinguishes the three different
utility ownership types. They define an investor-owned
utility as a business organization that provides a
product or service as a utility but is also managed as a
private enterprise. Municipalities are run by city
governments that are responsible for providing the
utility-related service; Cooperatives, located in rural
areas, belong to the people they serve and also share
excess revenue with those people (Nueces Electric
Cooperative, 2018). In the state of Texas,
municipalities and cooperatives are exempt from
deregulation and have the right to choose to participate
in the retail electric market if they vote to. The Public
Utility Commission of Texas (2019) states that
although customers of municipalities and cooperatives
do not have an actual role in managing their utility,
they can elect the people that run them and voice their
opinion. Cooperatives and municipalities, however,
may have no motive to switch to a deregulated market
since free market competition may not greatly benefit
them. This is because cooperatives are run by the
people who are a part of them, and municipalities are
publicly owned; thus, the effect of deregulation may
not be accurately predicted for these ownership types.
For this reason, the analysis will focus primarily on
deregulation’s effect on investor-owned utilities.

2

Approved renewable energy sources can be found by state at:
http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program
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Literature Review: There are concerns regarding the
efficiency and costliness of an RPS. The first RPS
mandate dates back to 1983 in Iowa (Barbose, 2017).
The purpose of this mandate is to increase renewable
energy sources used by each state to help reverse the
effects of climate change. However, even with these
new initiatives, there have been no major
improvements with emission trends based on the most
recent data, and nations are adopting minimal policies
in an attempt to slow the effects of climate change
(Nordhaus, 2018). Opponents of RPS standards believe
the policy is ineffective in reducing emissions because
the mandate is not universally applied across the states,
does not address externalities directly, specifies a
technology instead of emissions performance, and
applies uniquely to one sector (Montgomery, 2005).
Even though these inefficiencies occur, there are
benefits from implementing the policy. Barbose et al.
(2016) state that carbon dioxide was cut by 59 million
metric tons (worth about $2.2 billion), $5.2 billion was
provided in health and environmental benefits, water
withdrawals and consumption were reduced, and
200,000 gross domestic jobs were supported in 2013.
An RPS is known to be a more expensive way
to lower emissions, but it is important to know by
exactly how much the mandate would cost through
increased electricity prices and who would be the most
affected. RPS standards are shown to be about twice as
costly in reducing greenhouse gases (GHG) than other
sources, and renewable energy may be hard to procure
with the restrictions that some state RPS mandates
impose on firms (Lyon and Mayo, 2010). Tra (2015)
estimated that utilities subjected to an RPS that serve
the residential and commercial sectors have increases
in electricity prices by 3 percent.
A contributing factor to these price changes
associated with an RPS could be the deregulation of
state energy markets. Many states with some form of
deregulation have also adopted an RPS.3 However, a
little more than half of states with an RPS do not have
full deregulation (both wholesale access and retail
choice). This variation will help provide clear results

on the effects of deregulation in states with and without
RPS.

3

4

See Table 1 for a list of states and the years they adopted an
RPS and types of deregulation

Empirical Methodology
Data: The data used for this empirical analysis is
retrieved from the U.S. Energy Information
Administration (EIA) and the Database of State
Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE).
The EIA (2018) provides the revenue, sales, and
customer count of electric utilities from 1990-2017
separated by residential, commercial, industrial,
transportation, and “other” sectors within the U.S. The
information is further separated by industry sector
categories.4 This research focuses on the residential
and commercial sectors. To find the average price per
kWh for each utility, I divide the residential and
commercial sectors’ revenue by sales. Utilities are
represented by their state, unique utility number, year,
and ownership type.
The method used will consist of an OLS
regression, which is a simple linear regression model.
When the explanatory variable of the model (in this
case the RPS) is correlated with the error term (the
unobservable effects), the regression suffers from an
endogeneity problem. To overcome this potential
endogeneity problem, the analysis will rely on a fixedeffect estimator to identify the unobservable effect of
an RPS mandate on utilities’ electricity rates. It is also
important to identify the time-invariant omitted
characteristics and control for them to find the true
unbiased effect that an RPS mandate has on electricity
prices. An example of a time-invariant characteristic
would be Nevada’s solar energy potential. Not all
states have as many sunny days as Nevada; therefore,
not all states could effectively use this renewable
resource. Nevada’s solar potential also does not vary
per year; it is a consistent state characteristic that may
create bias results in our estimator. Tra (2015) states
that using a group-specific fixed effect estimator will
help to control for the problem; in this case, it will be a
state-by-year fixed effect.

Categories include: total electric industry, full-service
providers, restructured retail service providers, energy-only
providers, and delivery-only service
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The data set contains a total of 63,087
observations. The number of electric utilities in this
study is 2,622, from 1990-2017. There was a
significant drop in utilities after 2011 from the EIA
database, and the reason is due to an abbreviated
version of the form to reduce the reporting burden for
utilities. The smaller utilities are still available to
incorporate into the data set; however, the residential
and commercial sectors in the new files are not
distinguishable from one another. Therefore, this drop
of roughly 1,000 utilities after 2011 cannot be fixed,
but it will be taken into consideration.
Utility companies located in more than one
state create a potential problem with the results, so they
are dropped from the analysis. The state Iowa will also
be dropped from the data since its RPS was
implemented at an earlier time than what is covered in
this analysis. The data set is unbalanced, meaning not
every utility appears within every year observed. I
chose not to drop utilities that disappear after a certain
time period (from possibly closing down or merging
with another company) because it creates a selection
bias. This means that the only utilities included in the

5

data would be those that have survived throughout the
time-period analyzed which may skew the results.
There are nine different types of electric
utilities that can be found within states that may be
subject to an RPS. 5 Tra (2015) mentions that there are
only three types of major utilities operating in all states,
and they account for about 84 percent of all electricity
sales. Therefore, the paper will only use data on those
three types: investor-owned utilities, municipalities,
and cooperatives. The DSIRE database provides
information on variables that characterize the presence
of an RPS, which utilities are affected by the RPS, and
the type of energy market a state has (full deregulated
energy market, wholesale accessibility only, retail
choice only, or regulated market).
The variables that will be used in the analysis
are listed and described in Table 2. The dependent
variable will be the average electricity price of an
electric utility provider that operates in a state in
residential and commercial sectors. For these
dependent variables, the natural log will be taken to
normalize the distribution of the data.

Table 2
Summary Statistics

Other covariates that will impact utility price
are state characteristics that control for the diversity of
electricity’s demand and supply across state borders,
such as the state fuel costs. Coal and natural gas are
substitutes to renewable energy sources; therefore,
their price has a significant impact on electricity prices
within RPS states. Other important characteristics
include a state's population and population density.
States with larger populations have a larger demand.

However, a higher population density will result in
lower capital costs and electricity rates (Tra, 2015).
These state-by-state differences will be controlled for
by using a state-by-year fixed effects estimator.
Since this paper will look for a consistent linear
trend overtime for the outcomes of the regressions, the
state-by-year fixed effects will be applied using
continuous linear time trends (i.state#c.year). Wolfers
(2013) conducted a study analyzing divorce laws and

5Including:

cooperatives, facility, federal, investor-owned,
municipals, political subdivision, power marketer, state, and
other
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their correlated increase in divorce rates. In order to
account for slow-moving social and demographic
trends within each state, Wolfers included a statespecific linear time trend. This paper will also
incorporate state-specific trends to control for price
differences across states that might affect state motives
for incorporating deregulation and RPS. One fear with
using state-specific trends is that the results may be
sensitive to their inclusion, creating an omitted variable
bias (Wolfers, 2003). For this reason, each regression
in this study will show results before and after the
inclusion of state trends to interpret the magnitude of
sensitivity the data may have.
Econometric Specification: This analysis will be
modeled after Tra’s (2015) study with the addition of
data from 2012-2017, while also incorporating the
deregulation of electricity markets in the model. A
panel data set will be used for this type of analysis in
order to control for the multiple changes within states
over a period of time. The dependent variable in this
study will be the natural log price of electricity from
utilities in each state over time (Priceist), and there will
be two separate regressions for each sector: log of
residential price (lrpriceist) and log of commercial
price (lcpriceist).
This study will include a fixed-effects
estimator. Fixed-effects (FE) assumes that all
unobserved utility characteristics that can influence the
adoption of an RPS are time-invariant. The model will
incorporate utility fixed effects (FE) in every
regression by default to capture the time-invariant
unobserved characteristics between each utility and
remove them from the model. This will remove the
utility-specific effect (utilityi) from the error term and
only leave the idiosyncratic error term. (uist).
Model
The first objective is to observe how RPS alone
will impact prices in both the residential and the
consumer sectors. Using the panel data set, utility
numbers will be the panel variable while year will be
the time variable. The econometric equation is seen
below:

6Tra uses state-by-year fixed effects instead of state trends; however,

because deregulation does not vary within a state, state-by-year fixed
effects kicks out observations in regression that include deregulation
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Equation 1. RPS Effects on all Utilities
log 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼1 𝑅𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 +
𝛽𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛾𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖 𝑥𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛿𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 ×
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + Φ𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑡
The model is linear with parameters α, β, γ, and error
term uist. When running a regression, one of the most
important properties is the mean-independence
assumption. The mean-independence assumption
ensures that the unobserved characteristics of state
utilities that influence the dependent variable (Priceist)
are not also correlated with the adoption of an RPS
regulation. This is guaranteed by the random selection
of electric utilities in the sample. If this assumption
fails, then the entire regression will be biased. The
idiosyncratic error term (uist) must also be
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, in this
case RPS and deregulation, throughout all time periods
to ensure the model avoids this issue of strict
endogeneity.
The error term (uist) will capture all the
unobserved factors that are not controlled for in the
equation. In addition, the regression will include year
fixed effects (year) to control for national unobserved
effects that are time-variant, ownership fixed effects
(ownership x year) to control for time-variant
differences among different ownership types, a state
trend variable (state x year) to control for state
unobserved factors that affect price trends and the
likelihood of adopting rps or deregulation trends over
time, the RPS dummy variable that equals 1 if affected
by RPS, and the log of the customer count for both
sectors to control for utility size. 6 The results are listed
below in Table 3.
The second model will provide the primary
results of this study. It will illustrate the effects of both
RPS and different forms of deregulation on electricity
rates, but this model will only include Investor-Owned
utilities. The same fixed effects will be included with
the exception of ownership fixed effects since only one
ownership type will be included. The results for
Equation 2 will be seen in Table 4.

due to perfect collinearity. Regardless, trends and state-by-year fixed
effects were able to produce similar results.
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Equation 2. Effects of RPS and Deregulation on
Investor-Owned Utilities
log 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼1 𝑅𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡 +
𝛼3 𝑅𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡 × 𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 +
𝛼4 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛿𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 ×
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + Φ𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑡
Results
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Table 3 displays the first results of RPS on all
electric utilities in the sample. Four regressions were
run to include both sectors with and without state
trends. The only significant value is found in the
residential sector with state trends; it confirms that an
RPS does increase electricity rates by 3.2 percent. Tra
(2015) provides similar results explaining that an RPS
increases electricity rates by 3 percent on average.

Table 3.
Effects of RPS on All Utilities

Note. Numbers represent shift in log of prices. R^2 shown is within R-squared from STATA. All results include utilityfixed effects to control for time-varying unobservable factors. Parentheses show robust standard errors. *p-value < 0.10,
**p-value < 0.05, ***p-value < 0.01

Table 4 illustrates the estimated effects of RPS
and deregulation on investor-owned utilities with and
without state trends. One important observation is that
wholesale deregulation does not seem to be as
significant on its own. In the commercial sector, full
deregulation lowers costs by around 5.4 percent;

however, RPS increases costs by 6.8 percent which
results in an overall increase of just 1.4 percent. On the
other hand, the residential sector shows that retail and
full deregulation offset the increase in RPS by roughly
2 percent, leading to an overall decrease for residential
consumers.

Table 4:
Effects of RPS and Deregulation on Investor-Owned Utilities
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Note. Numbers represent shift in log of prices. R^2 shown is within R-squared from STATA. All results include utilityfixed effects to control for time-varying unobservable factors. Parentheses show robust standard errors. *p-value < 0.10,
**p-value < 0.05, ***p-value < 0.01

Discussion
Public policies are intended to promote general
welfare. RPS is expected to increase electricity prices
due to the costliness of generating renewable energy
along with the costs of cheaper substitutes. With
electricity prices going up with the integration of
renewable portfolio standards, the public is likely to
vote against the policy. However, deregulation is
expected to increase market competition which in turn
creates lower prices for consumers and promotes
innovation that leads to greater efficiency. This is
definitely the case when it comes to investor-owned
utilities. The public is more likely to support RPS and
its benefits towards the environment if it also lowers
electricity prices. This support will allow policy
makers to decrease negative externalities - like air
pollution - in the environment while lowering costs for
consumers. It is also interesting to note that the
residential sector benefits more from retail and full
deregulation than the commercial sector. Since
corporations are expected to engage in market
competition, it is more likely that innovation and the
desire to maximize profits would benefit corporations
more. The results, however, reveal the opposite. This
makes residential consumers the target audience for the
benefit associated with RPS and full deregulation.
Knowledge of the potential benefits of
combining RPS with full market competition allows
consumers to make well informed decisions on state
policies. The state of Nevada is among those that chose
not to deregulate its energy markets, yet the RPS
mandate may also be increasing its requirement within
the next year. This could only mean that prices will
probably increase for consumers in the residential and
commercial sectors. The increase in electricity prices
could be offset with full market competition, but the
public needs to be made aware of this potential benefit.
Conclusion
Overall, implementing an RPS may lead to
electricity price increases. Yet, states that have
implemented retail choice or full competition have

managed to offset these increases and not feel the
social costs of the policy. The state of Nevada is among
those that chose not to deregulate its energy markets,
yet the RPS mandate may also be increasing its
requirement within the next year. This could only mean
that prices will increase for consumers in the
residential and commercial sectors.
Public policy makers should make the
correlation between RPS and deregulation clearer for
individuals. This will encourage voters to make more
informed decisions on what they want and allow policy
makers to create better policies that will counteract
negative externalities caused by fossil fuels. When
integrating a method that promotes environmental
sustainability and the general welfare of the people,
public policy will be able to resolve environmental
concerns without the costs associated with it.
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Appendix A: Figure 1. U.S. State Renewable Energy Initiatives

Source: National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), (2018).
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Appendix B: Figure 2. Map of RPS Policies in the U.S.

Source: Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency, (DSIRE), (2018).
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Appendix C: Table 1. RPS and Deregulation State and Year
STATES
Alabama - AL
Alaska - AK
Arizona - AZ
Arkansas - AR
California - CA
Colorado - CO
Connecticut - CT
Delaware - DE
Florida - FL
Georgia - GA
Hawaii - HI
Idaho - ID
Illinois - IL
Indiana - IN
Iowa - IA
Kansas - KS
Kentucky - KY
Louisiana - LA
Maine - ME
Maryland - MD
Massachusetts - MA
Michigan - MI
Minnesota - MN
Mississippi - MS
Missouri - MO
Montana - MT
Nebraska - NE
Nevada - NV
New Hampshire- NH
New Jersey - NJ
New Mexico - NM
New York - NY
North Carolina - NC
North Dakota - ND
Ohio - OH
Oklahoma - OK
Oregon - OR
Pennsylvania - PA
Rhode Island - RI
South Carolina - SC
South Dakota - SD
Tennessee - TN
Texas - TX
Utah - UT
Vermont - VT
Virginia - VA
Washington - WA
West Virginia - WV
Wisconsin - WI
Wyoming - WY

RPS YEAR

ACCESS TO WHOLSALE

RETAIL CHOICE

BOTH RETAIL AND WHOLESALE

1996
2004
1998

1998

1998

1997
1997

2000
2001

2000
2001

2002
2002
2002
2004
2002
2004
1997
1997
1997
2002
2002
2004
2002
2002
2004

1999

2002

2000
2000
1998
2001

2000
2000
1998
2002

1997
1997
2004
1999
2002
2002
2002
2004

1998
1999

1998
1999

1998

1999

2001

2002

2007
1998
2004

1997
1997

1999
1998

1999
1998

1999

2002
1997
1997

2002

2002

1997
2002

2002

2002

2002
2004
1998
2005

2004
2007
1983
2009

1997
2004
1997
2008
1994
2008
2005
1997
2007
1999
2000
2004
2007
2008

2015
2006
1998

2002
2002
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Appendix D: Table 2. Summary Statistics
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Appendix E: Table 3: Effects of RPS on All Utilities

Note. Numbers represent shift in log of prices. R^2 shown is within R-squared from STATA. All results include
utility-fixed effects to control for time-varying unobservable factors. Parentheses show robust standard errors.
*p-value < 0.10, **p-value < 0.05, ***p-value < 0.01
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Appendix F: Table 4. Effects of RPS and Deregulation on Investor-Owned Utilities

Note. Numbers represent shift in log of prices. R^2 shown is within R-squared from STATA. All results include
utility-fixed effects to control for time-varying unobservable factors. Parentheses show robust standard errors.
*p-value < 0.10, **p-value < 0.05, ***p-value < 0.01
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